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 Privileges prevail over pleading 
A Court of Appeal decision has relieved the appellants from a number of UCPR pleading rules, 
also ensuring that their privileges against self-incrimination and exposure to civil penalty are not 
compromised. 
Pleading – self-incrimination and penalty privileges – privileges prevail over UCPR 
pleading rules – how pleading rules varied to permit reliance on privileges 
In Anderson v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] QCA 301 the 
Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from the decision of the primary judge (ASIC v 
Managed Investments Ltd No 3 [2012] QSC 74. See (2012) 32 (8) Proctor 38). The Court of 
Appeal was satisfied that the defendants’ non-compliance with the pleading rules in the Uniform 
Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) was justified by the claims to privilege against self-
incrimination or exposure to a penalty.  
Background 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) had brought proceedings 
seeking relief against three corporations and five individual defendants which included the 
imposition of pecuniary penalties for contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). ASIC 
applied for orders striking out paragraphs of the defences of the individual defendants. The 
application raised the question as to the extent to which the requirements for the UCPR for the 
pleading of a defence must be varied in order to permit the appellants to rely on the privileges 
against self-incrimination and exposure to a civil penalty.  It was not suggested that there was 
any practical difference between the two privileges for the way in which the pleading rules should 
give way to their operation. 
At first instance Fryberg J ruled that the operation of the pleading rules was qualified to permit a 
proper claim for either privilege. However, his Honour recognised only very limited qualifications, 
and ordered that the defendants were otherwise required to file defences which complied with 
the pleading rules. In particular, his Honour accepted that if the UCPR would require the 
admission of a fact alleged in the statement of claim, because the defendant believed it to be 
true, the defendants could decline to plead to the allegation and instead make a claim for 
privilege. Such a claim would override any deemed admission under UCPR r 166(1). In other 
circumstances the defendants had to plead a nonadmission or denial according to UCPR  r 166,  
subject only to the possibility of being exempted from the requirement to provide an 
explanation: ASIC v Managed Investments Ltd No 3 [2012] QSC 74 at [37]. 
 
The individual defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal.  
 
Issues 
 
The appellants argued on appeal that the orders made by the primary judge meant that the 
benefit of the each privilege would be compromised. They argued that a pleading according to 
the judgment at first instance would reveal a defendant's belief as to the truth or falsity of each 
allegation in ASIC's case, or (in the case of non-admissions) a defendant's uncertainty as to its 
truth. The operation of the privileges would be prejudiced by this disclosure of their states of 
mind. It was said that ASIC would gain an unfair forensic advantage by knowing what parts of its 
case ultimately would not be seriously challenged. It was further submitted that a defendant 
making a nonadmission would reveal an unawareness of a fact, where that lack of knowledge 
might itself be used by ASIC to advance ASIC's case, by its saying that the defendant should 
have been aware of the fact at the time of the relevant events.  
The issues for determination were whether the relief from compliance with the pleading rules 
went far enough to preserve the privileges and, if not, what orders should be made.  
 
 Analysis 
The lead judgment was delivered by Phillip McMurdo J, with whose reasons Holmes and White 
JJA agreed. His Honour first outlined the content of each privilege and the relevant principles for 
its operation (at [15]-[22]). He noted that the tension between these privileges and the modern 
procedural rules for civil proceedings in the UCPR is immediately apparent. Particular reference 
was made to the stated purpose of the rules as expressed in r 5, and to the obligations imposed 
on defendants by rr 165 (answering pleadings), 166 (denials and nonadmissions) and 167 
(unreasonable denials and nonadmissions).  
Phillip McMurdo J saw some potential for the operation of the privileges to be affected by the 
orders made at first instance.  His Honour said that a response to an allegation in which a 
defendant claimed the privilege could found an inference that the allegation was true, at least if 
the alleged fact was something of which the defendant would have direct knowledge.  This was 
because the privilege could be claimed only where the defendant would otherwise have to admit 
the allegation. 
It was noted that the question of whether, under what was ordered by the primary judge, a claim 
for privilege could be tendered as an admission was not fully argued. For this reason Phillip 
McMurdo J preferred not to express a concluded view about it. His Honour found, however, that 
the claim for privilege could nevertheless provide assistance in the ultimate proof of ASIC's case. 
His Honour suggested that this result could follow if, for example, a defendant gave evidence 
which was inconsistent with the allegation for which the claim for privilege was made. It may be 
that in that circumstance the pleaded claim for privilege could be used to discredit the defendant 
in cross-examination. In that way a defendant might be compelled to provide a pleading which 
ultimately assists ASIC to prove its case.  
The potential implications when a defendant pleaded a non-admission were then considered. 
Rule 166 permits the pleading of a nonadmission only if a defendant has made enquiries which 
are reasonable enquiries having regard to the time limited for the defence: r 166(3)(a),(b). There 
is also an obligation on a party making a nonadmission to make any further enquiries that may 
become reasonable and to amend the pleading appropriately: r 166(6).  If there is a failure to 
comply with these obligations the nonadmission is susceptible to being struck out. In that case 
the allegation is taken to be admitted. Phillip McMurdo J found that these conditions upon the 
ability to contest an allegation difficult to reconcile with the privileges against self-incrimination or 
exposure to a penalty, which require a plaintiff to prove its case without any assistance from the 
defendant. His Honour said (at [32]): 
A defendant might fail to make the required enquiry by choice, by inadvertence or perhaps 
because of a lack of means. Where there is a failure to enquire for any of those reasons, the 
consequence is that part of the plaintiff's case is established by the defendant's own 
conduct, rather than by evidence adduced by the plaintiff. Should that occur here, the 
defendant by his or her omission to inquire would assist in the proof of ASIC's case. 
Phillip McMurdo J also referred to a number of other pleading rules, which his Honour concluded  
could be potentially relevant, but which did not appear to have been considered by the primary 
judge: rr 149(1)(b), 149(1)(c), 150(4)(c), 150(1)(k), 150(1) and 157. His Honour suggested the 
matters which these rules required to be pleaded or particularised could well constitute 
information which, according to the privileges, the defendants cannot be compelled to provide, 
because the information could lead ASIC to other evidence which could be used to prove the 
case against them. His Honour found that it was necessary to make a specific order to the effect 
that a defendant was excused from compliance with these rules if to do so would tend to 
incriminate the defendant or expose him or her to a civil penalty.  
 
Phillip McMurdo J also examined the different approaches in MacDonald v ASIC (2007) 73 
NSWLR 612; [2007] NSWCA 304 (“McDonald”) and ASIC v Mining Projects Group Ltd (2007) 
164 FCR 32; [2007] FCA 1620 (“Mining Projects”) to the question whether the privileges against 
self-incrimination and self-exposure to a penalty might be prejudiced by requiring any form of 
positive case to be pleaded. He summarised these approaches, and his preferred approach, as 
follows (at [37]): 
According to Mason P [in MacDonald] the privilege could be preserved whilst still requiring a 
defendant to give notice of an intention to rely upon a relevant defence under 
the Corporations Act,  without requiring the defendant to plead the facts of that defence 
which are not already pleaded within the statement of claim. According to Finkelstein J 
[in Mining Projects], no notice of a positive case should be required. The difference here is 
unlikely to have a practical effect on the course of the proceedings or the privileges. In my 
view, the defendants should be required to give notice in the way indicated by Mason P. 
There was a further concern that under the primary judge's orders, there was potential for the 
operation of r 165(2) which could not have been intended. It was noted in that regard that a 
defendant who believed an allegation to be true at the time of pleading and made a claim for 
privilege could contradict the fact by evidence in the defendant’s case. Yet where the defendant 
was simply uncertain, r 165(2) would prevent the defendant from doing so.  
Although acknowledging the differences in procedural rules between jurisdictions, Phillip 
McMurdo J found the judgment in MacDonald to be particularly instructive. The defendant in that 
case was relieved from the requirements of the rules which would have required that he reveal 
his belief in the truth or otherwise of the facts alleged by ASIC. He was also relieved from the 
equivalent rules of r 149(1)(b)(c) and  r 150(1) and (4). His Honour described this outcome as far 
different from that put in place by the primary judge in the decision under appeal. 
Orders 
It was concluded that the regime put in place by the primary judge was not sufficient to prevent 
the pleading rules affecting the privileges, and it was necessary to further relieve the appellants 
from the requirements of the rules, consistent with the approach in Macdonald.  
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal with costs, and set aside paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 
orders made by the primary judge. The defendants were each ordered to file and serve his or her 
defence, in accordance with the orders, within 28 days of the judgment. 
As to the manner in which the pleading rules were to be varied to permit reliance on the 
privileges the court ordered (at [44]): 
A defence filed and served by an appellant must at a minimum: 
(a) state with respect to each allegation of fact in the statement of claim whether that 
allegation is admitted, not admitted or denied; 
(b) give notice of any intention by the defendant to rely upon any relevant statutory defence 
or ground of dispensation 
but is not otherwise required to comply with rr 149(1)(b), (c), 150, 157, 165 and 166 of 
the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. 
Comment 
The judgment provided the appellants with a dispensation from the requirements of a number of 
the pleading rules in the UCPR. Though still requiring defences in terms of admissions, 
nonadmissions and denials, the removal of the constraints on nonadmissions and denials 
imposed by rr 165 and 166 is particularly significant.  
The orders undoubtedly reduced the likelihood of further argument about the required content of 
the appellants’ pleadings that may have resulted from the regime put in place by the primary 
judge. They also ensure the benefit of each the privileges against self-incrimination and exposure 
to a civil penalty is not compromised by the pleading requirements under the UCPR. 
 
 
